

Attacking and Defending Kubernetes

Chemnitzer Linux-Tage 2021




kubernetes

Andy Wirtz, ATIX AG

A hacker gained access to 100 million Capital One credit card applications and accounts

By Rob McLean, *CNN Business*

Updated 2117 GMT (0517 HKT) July 30, 2019



CAPITAL ONE DATA BREACH

- 140,000 Social Security numbers
- 1 million Canadian Social Insurance numbers
- 80,000 bank account numbers
- Undisclosed number of names, addresses, credit scores, credit limits, balances, and other information

CNN BUSINESS

HACKER ARRESTED IN MASSIVE CAPITAL ONE DATA BREACH

CNN DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES **EVENT BEGINS 8P ET** **13:27:50** **CNN** NEW DAY

[https:](https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/29/business/capital-one-data-breach/index.html)

[//edition.cnn.com/2019/07/29/business/capital-one-data-breach/index.html](https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/29/business/capital-one-data-breach/index.html)

Docker Images Containing Cryptojacking Malware Distributed via Docker Hub

June 25, 2020 · Revie Lekshmanan



With Docker gaining popularity as a service to package and deploy software applications, malicious actors are taking advantage of the opportunity to target exposed API endpoints and craft malware-infested images to facilitate distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and mine cryptocurrencies.

<https://thehackernews.com/2020/06/cryptocurrency-docker-image.html>

Popular This Week



New Chrome 0-day Bug Under Active Attacks – Update Your Browser ASAP!



Extortion Gang Breaches Cybersecurity Firm Qualys Using Acelcion Exploit




Mazafaka – Elite Hacking

JACK MARTIN

JUN 12, 2020

Microsoft Azure Machine Learning Clusters Cryptojacked to Mine Monero

Hackers have attacked badly configured machine learning clusters on Microsoft's Azure cloud computing network, and hijacked them to mine Monero.



Microsoft announced on June 10 that it had discovered a number of cryptojacking attacks on powerful machine-learning clusters on its Azure cloud computing network.

<https://cointelegraph.com/news/microsoft-azure-machine-learning-clusters-cryptojacked-to-mine-monero>



< Back

Research

Lessons from the Cryptojacking Attack at Tesla

by RedLock CSI Team | 02.20.18, 6:00 AM

The Cryptojacking Epidemic

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<https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla>

NEWS

Hackers exploit Jenkins servers, make \$3 million by mining Monero

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WHITE PAPERS


How to Choose a Cloud Provider When Choosing a Cloud Provider

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Cloud Supplier Collaboration Model

If you run a Jenkins server, you might want to make sure it is fully patched, since researchers found "one of the biggest malicious mining operations ever discovered." The cyber crooks have already made more than \$3 million by installing malware that mines for Monero on vulnerable Windows machines. And now they are honing in on vulnerable, yet powerful, Jenkins servers.

<https://www.csoonline.com/article/3256314/hackers-exploit-jenkins-servers-make-3-million-by-mining-monero.html>



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Agenda



- 1 Attack Kubernetes
- 2 Demo of an Attack Path
- 3 Defend Kubernetes
- 4 Mitigate the Attack Path

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Virtual data center

- ▶ for container apps
- ▶ manages compute resources

Wide spread use

- ▶ interesting for attackers
- ▶ various attack surfaces




Access control

- ▶ to Kubernetes objects
- ▶ can be annulled

Unwarranted access

- ▶ read secrets, write workloads
- ▶ administer cluster




Container isolation

- ▶ of process, network, filesystem
- ▶ can be softened

Container outbreak

- ▶ access host file system
- ▶ root in container = root on host




Container communication

- ▶ in a flat network
- ▶ can be unlimited

Unwanted communication

- ▶ download malware
- ▶ talk to other apps




Allocatable resources

- ▶ are CPU, memory, storage
- ▶ can be misused

Consume resources

- ▶ crypto mining
- ▶ fork bombs




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Privilege escalation to control

- ▶ Kubernetes
- ▶ container hosts




Crypto Mining without detection

- ▶ divert compute resources
- ▶ share over network

Command injection

- ▶ ping servers
- ▶ execute additional commands




Access via reverse shell

- ▶ target machine initiates connection
- ▶ user's computer listens

Web application container

View access to Kubernetes

- ▶ read ServiceAccounts
- ▶ read Secrets




Edit access to Kubernetes

- ▶ create root container on master
- ▶ log into new container

Root user in container on master

- ▶ use hostPath
- ▶ read admin.conf




Cluster-admin access to Kubernetes

- ▶ create break-out container
- ▶ log into new container

Break-out container

Root user on host

- ▶ create mining container
- ▶ use docker



Cleanup

- ▶ delete root container
- ▶ delete break-out container

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Defence in depth

- ▶ attackers pick their targets
- ▶ layered security needed

Best practices

- ▶ limit attack surface
- ▶ principle of least privilege




Role-Based Access Control

Kubernetes bouncer

- ▶ for Kubernetes resources and others
- ▶ namespace- or cluster-wide

Least privilege access

- ▶ no access for apps and humans
- ▶ access for tools (CD, monitoring)



Container prison

- ▶ drop capabilities
- ▶ ensure separation



Prevent outbreak


- ▶ deny privileged/root/privilege escalation
- ▶ ensure isolation & RO root filesystem

Container firewall

- ▶ for ingress and egress
- ▶ with labels, namespaces, ip-blocks

Restrict communication

- ▶ default deny all
- ▶ allow-list specific traffic




Kubernetes limiter

- ▶ quotas for namespaces
- ▶ limits for containers, pods, pvcs

Assign resources

- ▶ split resources for tenants
- ▶ define min, max, default resources



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
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Mitigate 1

Mitigate reverse shell for container

- ▶ scan container images for vulnerabilities
- ▶ remove unnecessary software
- ▶ restrict traffic with NetworkPolicies




Mitigate installation of new software

- ▶ scan container images for vulnerabilities
- ▶ remove unnecessary software
- ▶ restrict traffic with NetworkPolicies

Mitigate 2

Mitigate privilege escalation to edit access

- ▶ avoid existence of unnecessary secrets
- ▶ restrict traffic with NetworkPolicies
- ▶ restrict access to API server with RBAC




Mitigate root container on master

- ▶ restrict with NetPol and RBAC
- ▶ don't tolerate container on master
- ▶ forbid root container with PSP

Mitigate 3

Mitigate shell for root container

- ▶ forbid root container with PSP
- ▶ restrict traffic with NetworkPolicies
- ▶ restrict access to API server with RBAC




Mitigate privilege escalation to cluster-admin

- ▶ don't tolerate container on master
- ▶ forbid root container with PSP
- ▶ forbid hostPath with PSP

Mitigate 4

Mitigate break-out container

- ▶ restrict with NetPol and RBAC
- ▶ forbid privileged container with PSP
- ▶ forbid hostPID with PSP



Mitigate docker run

- ▶ restrict with NetPol and RBAC
- ▶ forbid privileged container with PSP
- ▶ forbid hostPID with PSP

Defence in depth

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Best practices

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Outlook



Secure applications

- ▶ container image scanning and signing
- ▶ sandbox technologies



Use agents

- ▶ policy agent for compliance
- ▶ RT security agent for anomaly detection





< Back

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
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ATIX – SIMPLIFY YOUR DATACENTER



Open Source Automation Days: Münchens größte herstellerunabhängige Open Source Konferenz



Topics 2021:

- GitOps / DataOps
- Cloud:
 - Cloud-Native
 - Cloud-Management
 - Public-Cloud
 - Private-Cloud
 - Hybrid-Cloud
- Containerisierung
- Open Source
- IT-Automation
- Artificial Intelligence
- Security Automation
- *SPECIAL 2021 TOPIC:*
"Pandemy War - IT-Automatisierung in Zeiten von Corona"